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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff believes the statement ofthe Nature of the Case in the Appellant's 
Brief is more complete and accurate than that offered in the Respondent's Brief. 
Beyond that, two particular points require comment. 
First, Defendant errs in stating, as though it is an undisputed fact, that 
"Rydalch swerved to miss deer which were on the road." Respondent's Brief, page 5. 
That was Mr. Rydalch's deposition testimony. R., pages 245-47. Defendant later 
correctly concedes (Respondent's Brief, page 10), "the cause of the accident is 
irrelevant for the purposes of the issues before this Court" and "the focal issue is 
whether Rydalch was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the 
accident." That "focal issue" was the only defense raised by the summary judgment 
motion in the district court and, consequently, the only issue on which Plaintiff 
properly made a record. Indeed, Mr. Gerdon's deposition has not even been taken at 
this time. Should the issue of the cause of the accident be reached on remand, 
Plaintiff expects to show that the accident had nothing to do with deer on the road. 
For now, and for the purpose of informing this Court of the nature of the case, the 
proper approach to that issue is simply to summarize the allegations in the parties' 
pleadings, as was done in the Appellant's Brief. 
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Second, Defendant states that Ryda1ch was Gerdon's "co-employee" and that 
"Gerdon and Ryda1ch were en route on a work trip." Respondent's Brief, page 5. 
Gerdon agrees that Rydalch was also an employee of Con Paulos Chevrolet and that 
the trip was a "work trip" for Gerdon. But the main issue before the Court is whether 
there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether in accompanying Gerdon 
on the trip Ryda1ch was doing a duty of his employment so as to be in the course of 
his employment and protected from liability for his negligence pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 72-209(3) according to the standard stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Wilder v. Redd, III Idaho 741, 721 P .2d 1240 (1986), and Gage v. Express 
Personnel, 135 Idaho 250,253, 16 P.3d 926,929 (2000). 
Course of Proceedings in the District Court 
The Respondent's Brief takes issue with a poorly worded sentence in the 
Appellant's Brief which could be read as stating that Rydalch's motion to strike 
portions of Mr. Gerdon's affidavit was filed on July 13,2010, the same date as 
Ryda1ch filed his amended motion for summary judgment, but then the Respondent's 
Brief itself erroneously implies that Gerdon's affidavit was not filed until later. 
Compare sentence at pages 4-5 of Appellant's Brief with first full paragraph on page 
6 of the Respondent's Brief. Although Plaintiff does not believe this issue has 
anything to do with the issues on appeal, the correct chronology is that Mr. Gerdon's 
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affidavit was filed on July 1,2010, as part of Plaintiffs response to the Defendants' 
original motion for summary judgment (R., page 207), Defendants' amended motion 
for summary judgment was filed on July 13,2010 (R., page 284), Plaintiffs response 
to the amended motion for summary judgment was filed on August 9,2010 (R., page 
290), and Defendants' motion to strike was filed on August 11,2010 (R., page 300). 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff stands by the Statement of Facts in the Appellant's Brief, which is an 
accurate summary of the evidence in the district court regarding the motion for 
summary judgment. Rydalch, however, offers his own statement of facts "due to 
several factual inaccuracies" (Respondent's Brief, page 6), but never identifies those 
inaccuracies. At the same time, however, Rydalch's Statement of Facts in a number 
of particulars is misleading, omits evidence unfavorable to the defense, and violates 
the rule that in an appeal from a ruling granting a motion for summary judgment, the 
record is to be construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable 
inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor. E.g., Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 
841,846,216 PJd 130, 135 (2009). The particulars are: 
Rydalch, asserts that "Both Gerdon and Rydalch couriered vehicles on behalf 
of Con Paulos on more than one occasion," citing his own testimony at R., page 247. 
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Respondent's Brief, page 6. In fact, that testimony claimed only one previous 
occasIOn. 
The Respondent's Brief states, in the second paragraph on page 7, that "[a]t all 
material times hereto, Butch Heatwole was the sales manager, in charge of the entire 
sales department, (sic) for Con Paulos and Jerry King was a manager at Con Paulos," 
"Mr. Heatwole was Mr. King's supervisor," and "Both Mr. Heatwole and Mr. King 
had a supervisory role over Rydalch," citing Mr. Heatwole's deposition testimony at 
R., pages 271 llild 273. While Mr. Gerdon does not disagree with those statements as 
far as they go, Rydalch omits Mr. Heatwole's description of his and Mr. King's roles 
in this transaction, at R., pages 273-74, which is important to the question whether 
other evidence, especially Mr. King's affidavit, shows there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Rydalch went on the trip as a duty that he was employed to 
perform, or instead simply as a personal favor to Gerdon on Rydalch's day off, as 
Gerdon stated in his response to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 28. See, R., pages 
135-36. That description by Mr. Heatwole was as follows: 
"Q.Reflecting upon the transaction between Con Paulos and Mickey Gerdon 
for the sale of the Acadia that was involved in this accident, were you familiar 
with the decision not to use a courier service to pick that vehicle up? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you involved in the discussions in terms of whether to use or not use 
the courier service? 
A. No. 
Q. Who, if you know, would have made that decision? 
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A. That would have been the manager on duty. It would have been Jerry 
King. 
Q. And Jerry, I understand, no longer works at Con Paulos? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was his role at the time of the accident? 
A. He was a manager. 
Q. Would he have been in a supervisory capacity over Joseph Gerdon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you have been in a supervisory capacity over Josh Rydalch? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you consulted at all regarding the sale of the Acadia from Con Paulos 
Chevrolet to Mickey Gerdon prior to the accident? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you at a sales meeting the morning of the accident, which was 6/12 of 
'08? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did the transaction involving Mickey Gerdon's Acadia come up during the 
course of that sales meeting? 
A. No. I don't believe it was during the sales meeting. It was already put in 
place, plane tickets were already bought, the people that were designated 
to go was already in place, they knew where they were going to go to. So it 
was already a done deal. 
Q. Prior to the meeting that morning, on 6/12 of '08, what involvement, if any, 
did you have in tenns of the details involving picking up the Acadia in 
Spokane? 
A. None. I just knew as soon as Joe and Josh said they were leaving, they 
had plane tickets, they were ready to go, they were waiting for a check 
from the office for incidentals and stuff like that. If I'm not mistaken, 
Joe's mom paid for the airplane tickets in advance out of her own pocket. 
Q. Was that something that was nonnally requested of customers who had 
vehicles that needed to be transported? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you any knowledge of Con Paulos requesting customers to pay for 
the transport of their vehicle in advance of the purchase? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it fair to say that this was an unusual method that was employed outside 
ofthe nonnal methods used by Con Paulos to retrieve the Acadia from 
Spokane to Jerome? 
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A. I don't think it was unusual. What I think is because Mrs. Gerdon 
wanted her car immediately that these things were escalated, and she 
wanted the car like right now. So I think that's why she went and paid for 
the tickets, and she didn't want to wait for us to do it the other way, is my 
understanding. 
Q. All right. Do you know why Con Paulos or the supervisors at Con Paulos 
had both Joe Gerdon and Josh Ryda1ch fly to Spokane to retrieve the Acadia? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you aware that they were going to fly to Spokane on the 12th, pick 
up the Acadia, and drive all night and return back to Jerome the following day? 
A. I didn't know about it until, like I said, everything was already put in 
place and they were ready to go." 
R., pages 273-74 (bolding in original transcript). 
A short time later in that deposition, Heatwole expressly denied that he authorized 
Rydalch to make the trip. R., page 279. 
In the third paragraph on page 7 of the Respondent's Brief Defendant asserts 
"[p]er Con Paulos' payroll records, Ryda1ch's rate of pay was solely commission-
based on June 12 and June 13,2008" and "[a]t some time after June 13,2008 and not 
later than January 8,2009, Ryda1ch began receiving a daily guarantee of$77.00 in 
addition to his commission," citing the Affidavit of Jacki Marzitelli, including its 
exhibits, that was submitted by Defendants. Ms. Martizelli did make the quoted 
statements within her affidavit. However, Exhibit G, the "Salesperson's Guarantee" 
at R., page 183, and the "Retail Team Salesperson's Pay Plan" at R., page 184, both 
of which were signed by Rydalch on June 2, 2008, and which Martizelli's affidavit 
identifies, cites, and incorporates, shows he was guaranteed "minimum monthly pay" 
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of$I,500. Furthermore, although Exhibit J to Martizelli's affidavit, which 
specifically refers to a guarantee of$77.00 per day, was signed by Rydalch on June 8, 
2009, it does not say when that guarantee started. Thus, Martizelli's affidavit, 
considered in light of its exhibits, does not even unambiguously contradict the 
testimony of sales manager Heatwole that ifRydalch was considered to be working 
the day he went on the trip he should have been paid a $77 guarantee for that day, but 
he had no information Rydalch received that pay. R., pages 199,202. 
Near the beginning of the last paragraph on page 7 of the Respondent's Brief, 
Rydalch asserts "it is undisputed that Rydalch was the sales person on the deal," 
citing his own deposition testimony, and further asserts "Jerry King assisted Rydalch 
by locating the Acadia requested by Mrs. Gerdon," citing an unacknowledged copy of 
Mr. King's affidavit that is in the record. I These assertions are substantially 
controverted by paragraphs 6 and 12 of Mr. King's affidavit, as follows: 
" 
6. That the day prior to the accident, I was in charge of and did locate 
the Arcadia (sic) that was involved in the accident. I also made the 
arrangements to purchase the Arcadia (sic) for Joe Gerdon's parents. 
12. Joshua Rydalch was not going to make any money on the sales 
transaction of the Arcadia (sic) . 
. . . " R., page 313. 
I The Respondent's Briefrepeatedly cites only the unacknowledged copy ofMr. 
King's affidavit. The full affidavit, including notarial acknowledgment, is found at 
R., pages 312-14. 
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The next part of the same paragraph on page 7 of the Respondent's Brief states 
"[t]he Acadia Mrs. Gerdon wanted was located in Washington and needed to be 
transported to Jerome, Idaho for the purchase to close," citing R., pages 135 and 136, 
and "[o]n or about June 11,2008, a decision was made by Con Paulos that Con Paulos 
staff would travel to Washington and drive the Acadia from Washington to Jerome," 
citing R., pages 243 and 273-74. Regarding the first statement, the Respondent's 
Brief omits that the same part of the record includes Gerdon's response to 
Defendants' Interrogatory No. 28 (R., pages 135-36), which stated "[i]t was 
Defendant Ryda1ch's day off and as a favor to Plaintiff, Defendant Ryda1ch agreed to 
accompany Plaintiff to Spokane to retrieve the vehicle at Plaintiff's mother's expense, 
to help drive the vehicle back to Jerome." Regarding the second statement, it is 
unclear who Ryda1ch means by "Con Paulos" as there is no evidence that Mr. Con 
Paulos himself was in any way personally involved in this transaction. As noted 
above, Mr. Heatwole specifically denied any role in such a decision in the very pages 
of his deposition that Ryda1ch cites (R., pages 273-74), and Mr. King, who Heatwole 
identified as the manager in charge of the transaction, expressly denied that he 
authorized Ryda1ch to make the trip: 
" 
7. My instructions were that Joe Gerdon was to go by himself to pick 
up the Arcadia (sic), 'as a one man show.' 
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10. I never authorized, nor did Joshua Rydalch have the authority, to 
accompany Joe Gerdon on the trip to pick up the Arcadia (sic). 
11. I was unaware until after the accident that Joshua Rydalch went 
with Joe Gerdon on the trip to pick up the Arcadia (sic). 
13. Joshua Rydalch's accompanying Joe Gerdon on the trip was not 
only unauthorized by me, but was not in the scope or course of Joshua 
Rydalch's employment with Con Paulos, Chevrolet, Inc." 
Affidavit of Jerry King, at R., page 313. 
In the first full paragraph on page 8 of the Respondent's Brief, Rydalch asserts 
"there exists no evidence that Mr. King specifically informed Rydalch he was 
forbidden from going on the trip." While that statement is narrowly and literally true, 
it certainly does not provide the foundation for a conclusion as a matter of law that 
Ryda1ch was acting in the course of his employment in light of the statements in Mr. 
King's affidavit, quoted above. 
In the last paragraph on page 8 of the Respondent's Brief, Rydalch asserts " ... 
Mr. Heatwole testified that, before the morning of June 12,2008, the decision and 
plans were already made by Con Paulos to have Gerdon and Rydalch travel to 
Washington to procure the Acadia and drive it to Jerome." This description of a 
decision made by some generic "Con Paulos" as though it is an uncontroverted fact 
has already been discredited above. 
That deficiency in the record supporting the motion for summary judgment 
underscores the lack of significance of the statement attributed to Mr. Heatwole in the 
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first full paragraph on page 9 of the Respondent's Brief "that the deal would only get 
done if [Gerdon] and Defendant Joshua Rydalch retrieved the vehicle." If Mr. 
Heatwole had already learned that Rydalch was going on the trip, it is natural that he 
would have made such a statement, just as it would have been natural for Heatwole, if 
Mr. Gerdon had instead said some other person was going with him, to have then said 
the car would not be picked up unless Gerdon and that person picked it up. It would 
not mean as a matter of law that such another person, or Rydalch, was acting in the 
course of his employment by Con Paulos Chevrolet in going on the trip. 
In the first full paragraph on page 10 of the Respondent's Brief, Rydalch 
discusses how the accident occurred. As already pointed out in this brief in 
addressing the Nature of the Case, the cause of the accident should not be regarded as 
undisputed, and it is not relevant at this stage of this case. 
At pages 10-12 of the Respondent's Brief Rydalch recites various statements 
made by or on behalf of Gerdon in discovery responses, particularly that Gerdon 
received worker's compensation benefits for his injuries, Gerdon was in the course of 
his employment at the time of the accident, it was a "work trip" for Gerdon, Rydalch 
accompanied him on the trip, and Rydalch was his "co-worker." Gerdon does not 
dispute any of this, but as was thoroughly discussed in the Appellant's Briefnone of it 
provides a foundation for the conclusion that, as a matter of law, Rydalch was 
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performing a duty of his employment and was therefore acting in the course of his 
employment so as to be immune from tort liability under Idaho Code § 72-209(3). 
The question-begging nature ofRydalch's argument (which it primarily is, 
rather than being a statement of facts) in those pages is underscored by the assertion 
in footnote 2 and the accompanying text that the statement in a discovery response 
that "Plaintiff and Rydalch were to pick up a vehicle and drive it back to the Con 
Paulos dealership" admits of only the inference "that Gerdon and Rydalch were 
required to courier the Acadia to the dealership." Driving the vehicle to the 
dealership was certainly the purpose of the trip, but it does not establish that in going 
on this particular trip and helping to fulfill that purpose Rydalch was perfonning a 
duty of his employment any more than any other third person would have been, 
especially when sales manager Heatwole denied any role in deciding Rydalch would 
go on the trip, the manager on the transaction King unequivocally and expressly stated 
that Rydalch was not authorized to go on the trip, and Gerdon stated Rydalch came 
along only as a personal favor to him. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review - Summary Judgment Motions 
The next point in the Respondent's Brief that merits a reply beyond what is 
already in the Appellant's Briefis the contention at page 15 that the district court's 
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inclusion in its statement of the standard for summary judgment of the rules 
inapplicable to this case that the court may resolve conflicting inferences if it is the 
fact finder, and "as the trier of fact, may resolve conflicting inferences if the record 
reasonably supports the inferences" (see Appellant's Brief, pages 12-14) does not 
matter because, as the district court stated in responding to Plaintiffs motion for 
reconsideration, the district court only applied the rules relevant to jury trials. 
Respondent's Brief, page 15. Certainly, the district court did not deliberately apply 
the wrong standard, and Plaintiff does not doubt that the district court believed in 
good faith that it was applying the correct standard. Nevertheless, for the reasons 
explained in the Appellant's Brief and in this brief, Plaintiff believes the district court 
went too far under the standards stated by this Court in not only resolving conflicting 
inferences, but entirely discounting evidence that shows there are at least issues of 
material fact on the question whether Rydalch was not simply benefiting Con Paulos 
Chevrolet but was also performing a duty to Con Paulos Chevrolet in going on this 
trip, which is what is required in order for the exclusive remedy defense under Idaho 
Code § 72-209(3) to apply according to the Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in Wilder 
v. Redd, III Idaho 741, 721 P.2d 1240 (1986), and Gage v. Express Personnel, 135 
Idaho 250, 253, 16 P.3d 926, 929 (2000), and which is a question of fact. The 
irrelevant rules pertaining only to cases in which the court is to be the trier of fact that 
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the district court included in its statement of the standard for ruling on summary 
judgment motions indicate the approach that resulted in the district court's error. 
Course o(Emp[oyment Standard 
Plaintiff does not disagree with the general black letter rules stated from the 
bottom of page 15 to the middle of page 17 of the Respondent's Brief, but the brief 
starts to go adrift with the statement that "whether one was acting in the course of his 
employment is liberally construed in favor of the employee whose conduct is being 
evaluated." Defendant fails to acknowledge that as the party attempting to use the 
exclusive remedy defense to avoid civil tort liability, he has the burden of proof. See 
Basin Land Irrigation Company v. Hat Butte Canal Company, 114 Idaho 121, 123-24, 
754 P.2d 434, 436-37 (1988). 
Neither is Defendant's case helped by the statement in Reinstein v. McGregor 
Land and Livestock Co., 126 Idaho 156, 159, 879 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1994), that travel 
may fall within the course of employment so long as "the service of the employer was 
at least a concurrent cause of the trip, it need not be a paramount cause of the trip," 
which he next cites (Respondent's Brief, page 17). Nothing in the holding or 
discussion in Reinstein, or the early precedent it cites, indicates that the requisite 
service to the employer can consist only of doing something that happens to benefit 
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the employer as distinguished from performing a duty to the employer in going on the 
trip. 
Similarly, Rydalch's immediately following citations of Cheung v. Wasatch 
Electric, 136 Idaho 895, 42 P.3d 688 (2002), and Andrews v. Les Bois Masonry. Inc., 
127 Idaho 65,896 P.2d 973 (1995), are inapposite. In Cheung, the worker held 
entitled to compensation was traveling between work sites, which clearly was a duty 
of her employment. In Andrews, the denial of worker's compensation benefits was 
upheld based on the following test, which was also the test applied in Cheung: 
"When an employee's work requires the employee to travel away from the 
employer's place of business or the employee's normal place of work, the 
employee will be held to be within the course and scope of employment 
continuously during the trip, except when a distinct departure for personal 
business occurs." 
Andrews, at 127 Idaho 67, 896 P.2d 975 (emphasis added). 
There is at least an issue of material fact in this case whether Rydalch's work for Con 
Paulos Chevrolet required him to go on this trip with Gerdon. Furthennore, as 
explained in the discussion below of the Finholt v. Cresto decision, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has specifically not decided that the quoted test from Andrews and 
Cheung, also known as the "traveling employee" rule, should be applied outside of 
the context of worker's compensation claims or to determine tort liability. 
Rydalch next cites and quotes Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695 
(2007) (Respondent's Brief, page 18) for the first of several times in the Respondent's 
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Brief. Finholt, however, underscores why summary judgment should not have been 
granted in this case. In Finholt, an automobile accident victim, FinhoIt, sued a driver, 
Albrethsen, and other defendants for her personal injuries, and later added the driver's 
employer, a lawn service company (Fairway, owned by Cresto), on the respondeat 
superior theory that Albrethsen was acting in the course of his employment as an 
estimator for Cresto at the time of the accident. The evidence was that Albrethsen 
worked a split shift for Cresto, using his own vehicle to travel to potential job sites to 
prepare estimates during the mornings, was free to spend early afternoons as he chose, 
and was then required to return to the Cresto office during the late afternoons to 
perform follow-up telephone calls on the jobs he had estimated during the mornings. 
Albrethsen testified that at the time of the accident he had finished performing his 
estimates for the day, which were all in west Boise, and was on his way to meet his 
girlfriend for lunch in downtown Boise. Cresto moved for summary judgment on the 
basis that Albrethsen was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of 
the accident. The district court initially denied the motion, in large part because a 
potential inconsistency between Albrethsen' s direction of travel and the route he 
testifed he planned to take downtown allowed an inference that he was actually still 
working at the time of the collision. In a subsequent second deposition, however, 
Albrethsen testified he had completed his assignments and the reason for his direction 
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of travel was that he mistakenly believed the road he was on intersected with the route 
he planned to take downtown. The district court then granted Cresto' s motion for 
summary judgment, holding there were no genuine issues of material fact. 
On Finholt's appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment 
for Cresto. The "Discussion" part of its opinion first addressed Finholt's contention 
that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of fact 
regarding whether Albrethsen was truly offwork at the time of the collision. It 
summarized her argument on that point as follows: 
"First, Finholt points to Albrethsen's direction of travel (to the north), 
which she argues demonstrates that Albrethsen was not really on his way to 
downtown Boise (to the east). Second, she refers to Cresto's testimony that 
Fairway had customers 'pretty much all over' and while he didn't know 
whether there were any customers in the Banbury subdivision, he assumed 
there probably were some. From this, Finholt asserts there is sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to create an issue of fact about whether Albrethsen has 
completed his final assignment at the time of the accident, or was on his way to 
Banbury to do another estimate. Finally, Finholt points out that any books and 
records in Fairway's possession which might have substantiated Albrethsen's 
assignment the day of the accident, were lost, destroyed or given to the 
company that bought Fairway several months after the accident." 
Finholt, at 143 Idaho 897, 155 P.3d 698. 
The Court rejected Finholt's argument as mere speculation, insufficient to defeat 
Cresto's motion for summary judgment. Id. 
In this case, in contrast, Gerdon does not rely on speculation to contend 
Rydalch's motion for summary judgment should have been denied. The affidavit of 
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Mr. King, the manager in charge of the transaction, that Rydalch was not authorized 
to go on the trip and was not in the course of his employment in doing so is 
unequivocal. The testimony of sales manager Heatwole shows that he was not 
involved in either that decision or the transaction to sell the Acadia to Gerdon's 
parents and, at most, he simply knew that Rydalch was going shortly before Gerdon 
and Rydalch left. Gerdon stated that Rydalch went along simply as a personal favor 
to him. 
The Finholt opinion then addressed Ms. Finholt's remaining contentions that, 
even if Albrethsen was not specifically engaged in a work assignment at the moment 
of the accident, he was either engaged in a special errand or was a traveling employee. 
The standard it stated for whether an employee is within the course of employment 
under the "special errand" rule is that quoted, and partly bolded, in the first paragraph 
on page 18 of the Respondent's Brief. Immediately following, however, the Court 
continued its explanation of that rule as follows: 
" ... The special errand exception is premised on the idea that an employee 
leaving his normal place of work to perform a special job for an employer is, 
nevertheless, still performing part of his normal job." 
Finholt, at 143 Idaho 898, 155 P.3d 699. 
The same evidence discussed above also shows there are genuine issues of 
material fact regarding whether Rydalch was engaged in performing a special job for 
his employer. The Idaho Supreme Court has never held that the "special errand" rule 
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modifies the requirement based on the Wilder and Gage decisions that to be within the 
course of employment so as to be immune from negligence liability to a co-worker 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-209(3) an employee must have been performing a duty 
of his employment. 
Finally, the Finholt opinion addressed the "traveling employee" rule, quoting 
the standard from the Cheung case that was quoted above in this brief. As already 
discussed above, there is at least an issue of material fact in this case whether 
Rydalch's work for Con Paulos Chevrolet required him to go on this trip with Gerdon 
or whether he did it for personal reasons. The Finholt opinion reasoned that the 
"traveling employee" rule would not trigger Cresto's liability for his travel to a 
personal engagement in Boise. Id. The opinion also noted, however, that "[t]his 
Court has not applied the traveling employee theory outside the worker's 
compensation context where it expands employer liability" and it determined it "need 
not reach the question of whether to apply the traveling employee exception to tort 
claims." Id. 
In the same paragraph on page 18 of the Respondent's Brief in which Rydalch 
cites Finholt v. Cresto he also cites Wilder v. Redd as "finding defendant acted in 
course of employment even though he was on personal business, his lunch break, 
when the accident occurred." Unlike here, however, it was uncontroverted that the 
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defendant in Wilder would not have been driving where the accident occurred - his 
employer's parking lot - but for performing the duty of coming to work at the 
employer's facility. 
Rydalch next cites holdings that workers were in the course of their 
employment when using employer-provided transportation to travel to and from work. 
Respondent's Brief, pages 18-19. That scenario has nothing to do with the facts of 
this case, nor does it eliminate the requirement that the travel result from performing a 
duty to the employer. 
Rydalch next contends "the extent of an employer's control over an employee 
is not determinative in deciding whether the employee is acting in the course of his 
employment," citing Basin Land Irrigation Company v. Hat Butte Canal Company, 
atl14 Idaho 125, 754 P.2d 438. Respondent's Brief, page 19. While that proposition 
does not appear to be one of the holdings in Basin Land, Gerdon certainly does not 
dispute that a worker can be in the course of employment even though the employer 
does not control the details of how the worker performs his job, or sends him out into 
the field to work without supervision. That, however, or even the proposition as 
specifically stated by Rydalch, does not eliminate the requirement that the employee 
be performing a duty to the employer. The problem in Basin Land was determining 
which of two employers the worker was performing duties for at the time ofthe 
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accident and, as already noted in both this brief and the Appellant's Brief, the point in 
that decision most relevant to this case is that the party attempting to use the exclusive 
remedy defense to avoid civil tort liability has the burden of proof 
In the same paragraph on page 19 of the Respondent's Brief, Ryda1ch cites the 
Gage decision for the proposition that "an employee's violation of a company policy 
at the time of the injury is not sufficient to preclude a finding that the employee was 
acting within the course of employment." The relevant holding in Gage was that the 
employer's proscription of smoking on the job did not categorically compel denial of 
worker's compensation benefits to an employee who was smoking at the time of her 
injury, where this was but a slight deviation from the proper manner of performing the 
duty to the employer she was found to be engaged in at the time. See Gage, at 135 
Idaho 254, 16 P.3d 930. That holding does not mean an employee can for personal 
reasons, and without authorization from the relevant supervisor, decide to accompany 
another employee on a trip and then claim that, because the trip benefited the 
employer and another supervisor had become aware he was going, he was as a matter 
oflaw in the course of his employment for the purposes of tort liability. 
Finally in that paragraph of his Respondent's BriefRyda1ch cites Mortimer v. 
Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 845, 840 P.2d 383,389 (1992), for the 
proposition that "a worker is also acting in the course of his employment where the 
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act is done 'partly for personal reasons and partly to serve an employer. '" The point 
of Mortimer, however, was that there was evidence to support the Industrial 
Commission's conclusion that the employee was doing the work that resulted in his 
injury (measuring a roof) at least partly because he was instructed to do it by his 
employer. Again, unlike here according to the material evidence that favors Gerdon, 
the employee in Mortimer was performing a duty of his employment as he was 
instructed. 
Whether Rvdalch Was Acting in the Course of His Emplovment 
Rydalch's characterization of the standard for determining whether he was in 
the course of his employment being flawed, his application of that standard to contend 
he was in the course of his employment as a matter oflaw is at least equally flawed. 
Additional points regarding the discussion at pages 20-21 of the Respondent's Brief 
are as follows. 
In the first paragraph on page 20, Rydalch contends transporting vehicles to 
Con Paulos Chevrolet was one of his duties. As has already been noted above in 
replying to Rydalch's Statement of Facts, Rydalch actually only testified to having 
performed such a duty on one other occasion. Even so, the fact it may have been his 
duty at other times does not mean as a matter of law that it was his duty this time. 
The best that can be said for this contention by Rydalch is that it is a point for 
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argument to the jury, in view of the testimony by Heatwole, the affidavit from King, 
and the statement from Gerdon regarding whether Rydalch was directed, required, or 
even authorized to go on the trip. 
Rydalch begins his next paragraph, at the bottom of page 20 of the 
Respondent's Brief, with the sentence "[i]n his brief, Gerdon maintains that, although 
Rydalch was performing a duty he was employed to perform, he was not acting in 
the course of his employment because Jerry King did not authorize Rydalch to courier 
the Acadia" (bolding added). Gerdon has never maintained that Rydalch was 
performing a duty he was employed to perform. Indeed, Gerdon's central point is that 
the evidence does not establish that Rydalch was performing a duty he was employed 
to perform at the time of the accident. 
That paragraph in the Respondent's Brief continues with the nonsensical 
assertion that the instruction of Mr. King, the manager in charge of the transaction, 
that Gerdon should make the trip alone does not matter because some generic "Con 
Paulos" authorized Rydalch to go through awareness he was going and through 
instructing Gerdon's mother to pay for the airline tickets for the trip. Again, that is at 
best for Rydalch a point for argument to a jury. 
Next, in the same paragraph but on page 21 of the Respondent's Brief, Rydalch 
asserts that Heatwole's statement that the sale of the Acadia "would only get done" if 
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Gerdon and Rydalch "retrieved the vehicle" shows that Rydalch was required to assist 
in the delivery. This assertion has already been fully addressed in replying to 
Rydalch's Statement of Facts, above, as well as in the Appellant's Brief (at page 22). 
Again, it is at best for Rydalch a point for argument to a jury. 
The same is true regarding the significance, if any, of the next point raised by 
Rydalch in the same paragraph - the awareness that Heatwole gained that Rydalch 
was going on the trip, which according to Heatwole's own testimony, as has already 
been discussed, did not occur until the morning the trip began. That Heatwole did not 
object after he became aware Rydalch was going does not establish as a matter of law 
that Rydalch was acting in the course of his employment, particularly considering that 
Heatwole testified he was not involved in the transaction. 
Next, in the same paragraph, Rydalch asserts "[w]ith this knowledge in mind, 
Mr. Heatwole provided Gerdon and Rydalch permission to take breaks during the 
travel," citing pages 278-79 of the Clerk's Record. What Heatwole actually testified, 
at page 274 rather than pages 278-79 ofthe record, was "I told Mr. Gerdon if they 
were tired, well, they could pull over and stop or do whatever they had to do to be 
safe" and this was only after he found out about the trip on the morning of June lth 
when Gerdon and Rydalch were about to leave. This does not establish Rydalch was 
in the course of his employment any more than if Heatwole had made the same 
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statement upon learning that Gerdon was about to leave accompanied by a friend or 
relative who had no relationship to Con Paulos Chevrolet. 
Finally in that paragraph, at the bottom of page 21 of the Respondent's Brief, 
Ryda1ch asserts that "Mr. King's personal feelings about Rydalch's involvement" do 
not change the fact asserted in the brief that some generic "Con Paulos was aware of 
and approved ofRyda1ch's involvement." It is not a matter of "personal feelings." 
Instead, King, as the manager in charge of the transaction, unequivocally stated that 
Gerdon was to make the trip alone, he did not authorize Ryda1ch to go, and Rydalch 
was not in the course of his employment when he went on the trip. Ryda1ch has not 
brought forth a single other Con Paulos executive or employee who contradicts Mr. 
King's statements in his affidavit. 
In summary, perhaps the most revealing and important point to be drawn from 
the lengthy paragraph at pages 20-21 of the Respondent's Briefis that Rydalch not 
only has the summary judgment standard backward but also has the burden of proof 
backward on the issue whether Ryda1ch was in the course of his employment so as to 
qualifY for the immunity allowed in Idaho Code § 72-209(3). 
Rvdalch 's Reliance on Exceptions to the "Coming-and-Going" Doctrine 
Next, from the top of page 22 to the top of page 24 of the Respondent's Brief, 
Rydalch contends that his "travel falls within the several exceptions to the general 
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'coming-and-going'doctrine." All of the cases, doctrines, and asserted facts that 
Rydalch relies upon in this section of his brief were thoroughly discussed in this 
brief's reply regarding the "Course of Employment" standard, above. Only the 
second-to-the-last sentence of this part of the Respondent's Brief, beginning at the 
bottom of page 23, merits additional comment. That sentence asserts: "[a]s 
delivering the Acadia to Con Paulos involves providing a service to Con Paulos, 
whether other purposes existed for Rydalch' s travel is irrelevant and does not change 
the fact that Rydalch was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the 
accident." That sentence probably encapsulates the central fallacy ofRydalch's 
contentions and the district court's holdings in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has never held that evidence an employee coincidentally provided a benefit or a 
service to an employer is sufficient to establish as a matter of law that the employee 
was within the course of his or her employment so as to qualifY for the immunity from 
tort liability to a co-employee allowed by Idaho Code § 72-209(3). Instead, what is 
required for immunity is that the tortfeasor be performing a duty of the employment. 
The Compensation Factor 
Next, at page 24 of the Respondent's Brief, Rydalch addresses the fact Rydalch 
was not paid for the trip and asserts "whether Rydalch was compensated is irrelevant 
because Rydalch was, in fact, performing an employment duty on behalf of Con 
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Paulos when the accident occurred." For all of the reasons already discussed, the 
premise that Rydalch was performing an employment duty fails. Beyond that, Gerdon 
certainly does not contend that the fact an employee was not paid conclusively 
establishes he was not in the course of his employment, but it is a relevant fact for 
argument to a jury on that question. 
At the bottom of page 24, Rydalch again mistakenly asserts it is established 
that at the time of the accident Rydalch was paid by commission only. That error was 
addressed in replying to Rydalch's Statement of Facts, above. In connection with that 
assertion, Rydalch, in footnote 3 at page 24 of the Respondent's Brief, asserts Mr. 
Heatwole's testimony that Rydalch should have received a daily guarantee ifhe was 
considered to be working was "speculative and unfounded." That assertion is 
mistaken. While Heatwole testified he was not familiar with the payroll records, he 
did not testifY that he, as the sales manager, was unfamiliar with how the sales staff 
was to be paid. 
The Fact Gerdon Was in the Course of His Employment Does Not 
Necessarily Mean Rvdalch Was in the Course of His Emplovment 
At page 25 of the Respondent's Brief Rydalch states "Gerdon's assertion that 
he was acting in the course of his employment at the time of the work-related 
accident, but Rydalch was not, defies logic." Actually, Rydalch's statement is the non 
sequitur. There is no dispute that Gerdon was in the course of his employment. It is 
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established by, among other evidence, the same evidence that most strongly shows at 
least an issue of material fact as to whether Ryda1ch was in the course of his 
employment - Mr. King's affidavit. That affidavit shows unequivocally that Gerdon 
was instructed to go on the trip as a duty of his employment, just as it unequivocally 
states that Rydalch was not even authorized to go on the trip. R., pages 312-14. As 
has already been exhaustively and repeatedly discussed, the fact Ryda1ch's 
participation in the trip also provided a benefit to Con Paulos Chevrolet does not 
establish as a matter of law that he was perfonning a duty of his employment, as 
distinguished from simply doing a personal favor for Gerdon as Gerdon stated. 
Rydalch 's Assertion That He Was an Agent of Con Paulos Chevrolet at the 
Time of the Accident 
Next, Rydalch, at pages 25-26 of the Respondent's Brief, contends that even if 
he was not acting in the course of his employment, he was still acting as the agent of 
Con Paulos Chevrolet, so as to protected from civil liability to Gerdon on that 
separate basis under Idaho Code § 72-209(3). He asserts that, because Gerdon had 
actual authority from Con Paulos to courier the Acadia, and he requested Ryda1ch to 
drive during the trip, "Ryda1ch was acting as the agent of Con Paulos with either 
express or implied authority at the time of the accident." 
As authority for this agency theory, Ryda1ch cites the leading Idaho case of 
Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 P.2d 900 (1985), but only summarily states the 
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standards for the existence of agency relationships explained in that decision. A full 
statement of those standards makes obvious the flaws in Rydalch's agency theory. 
The Bailey decision states them as follows: 
"There are three separate types of agency, any of which are sufficient to 
bind the principal to a contract entered into by an agent with a third party, and 
make the principal responsible for the agent's tortious acts, so long as the agent 
has acted within the course and scope of authority delegated by the principal. 
The three types of agencies are: express authority, implied authority, and 
apparent authority. . .. 
Both express and implied authority are forms of actual authority. 
Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly 
granted the agent to act in the principal's name .... Implied authority refers to 
that authority 'which is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform' 
the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal. ... 
Apparent authority differs from actual authority. It is created when the 
principal 'voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a person of 
ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature of a 
particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to 
existing authority.' ... Apparent authority cannot be created by the acts and 
statements of the agent alone .... Finally, significant to this appeal, where the 
existence of an agency relationship is disputed-whether or not there is 
apparent authority on the agent's part to act as he acted-it is a question for the 
trier of fact to resolve from the evidence. 
Bailey, at 109 Idaho 497-98, 708 P.2d 902-903 (citations omitted; italics in 
original). 
Applying those standards here, the principal is clearly Con Paulos Chevrolet. 
With respect to express authority, there is no evidence, and certainly not evidence 
sufficient to establish as a matter of law, that any manager at Con Paulos Chevrolet 
expressly gave Gerdon authority to direct or give anyone else permission to drive the 
Acadia on behalf of Con Paulos. With respect to implied authority, there also is not 
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evidence to establish as a matter of law that such authority to direct or give anyone 
else permission to drive was necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform 
the authority granted to Gerdon. With respect to apparent authority, there also is not 
evidence to establish as a matter of law that Con Paulos placed Gerdon "in such a 
position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and 
the nature of a particular business, [would have been] justified in believing that 
[Gerdon was] acting pursuant to existing authority" in asking or allowing Rydalch to 
drive, especially considering that "apparent authority cannot be created by the acts 
and statements of the agent alone." At best for Rydalch, these too are questions of 
fact for argument to a jury. 
The Ruling Striking Paragraph 7 From Mr. Gerdon 's Affidavit 
Rydalch responds at pages 27-29 of the Respondent's Brief to the question 
whether the district court erred in striking paragraph 7 from Mr. Gerdon's affidavit. 
Gerdon has no quarrel with any of the rules stated at pages 27-28 of the Respondent's 
Brief. The issue, rather, is how those rules were applied by the district court in this 
case. As to that issue, Gerdon does not believe Rydalch has raised any contentions 
that require reply in addition to what was already stated in the Appellant's Brief and 
in the preceding parts of this brief, except for the following points. 
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First, Rydalch's description at page 2S of his brief of what parts of paragraph 7 
were stricken from is correct.2 This means the language in paragraph 7 reading 
"[t]hat because Defendant Joshua Rydalch was on Affiant's team" was not stricken. 
That very language, however, provides the foundation of personal knowledge for the 
rest of paragraph 7, which is a reason why the district court erred in ruling that the 
stricken parts were conclusory. 
Second, Rydalch discusses the day at issue as June 13, 200S, and bases part of 
his argument on other events that were scheduled for later that day. Respondent's 
Brief, page 29. The day offwas actually June 12, 200S, the date the trip began. See 
Gerdon's response to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 2S. R., pages 135-36. The 
accident happened at 3:49 a.m. on June 13, 200S. See R., page 245. Candidly, 
Plaintiff has contributed to this confusion in that the paragraph 7 refers to the day off 
as being the "day of the accident." 
Rvdalch is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal 
At page 30 of his Respondent's Brief, Rydalch contends he should be awarded 
attorney fees on appeal because "Gerdon's appeal is frivolous and is neither warranted 
by nor well-grounded in the existing facts or law." As the extensive and substantial 
2 In this section of his brief, however, as well as in his Statement of Facts, Rydalch 
cites only an incomplete copy of Gerdon's affidavit that somehow got into the Clerk's 
Record at R., pages 207 -OS. The complete affidavit is found at R., pages 214-16. 
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discussions of facts and law in this brief and the Appellant's Brief show, that is 
clearly not the case. It is fair to wonder ifRydalch's claim for attorney fees is 
primarily a stratagem to distract attention from the weakness of his own arguments 
with respect to whether the summary judgment should be affirmed. Indeed, if anyone 
argument presented in this case is frivolous it is Rydalch's claim for attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment that the district court granted in favor of Defendant 
Joshua Rydalch should be reversed and this case should be remanded for trial. 
Dated, October 7,2011. 
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